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Results of a Transpersonal, Narrative, 
and Phenomenological Psychotherapy for Psychosis
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In our academically based, psychiatric outpatient practice, we have encountered those 
who wish to avoid medications for treatment for psychosis. This study is a qualitative/
quantitative study in progress of a patient population diagnosed with psychosis and 
managed primarily without medication. We reflect upon the transpersonal foundations 
of an approach in which voices and visions are accepted as real, given full ontological 
status, and addressed within a dialogical framework. We present interim data on a series 
of 51 patients over 20 years old who presented with psychosis and who remained with us 
for at least six months in their effort to reduce or eliminate medication. (An additional 
201 patients presented themselves for treatment but did not continue for six months.) The 
practitioners use questionnaires to quantify symptom level, including the Brief Psychiatric 
Rating Scale, Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale, two depression rating scales, the 
Clinical Global Inventory, and the Revised Behavior and Symptom Identification Scale. 
In addition, narrative interviews are utilized in a review of symptoms. Of these 51 
individuals, 38 managed psychosis without the use of medication (or with very occasional 
medication as sleeping assist). Another nine managed well on low dose medications. 
Three individuals required higher levels of medication and one became progressively 
worse despite all efforts and was eventually involuntarily placed in the State Hospital. The 
overall cost-benefit is favorable in creating fewer hospitalization, crises, and diminished 
suicidality. The results do not hint at one algorithmic solution, but suggest the need for 
individualized approaches that are client-centered and build upon the previous successes 
of the person, enroll family and friends in a community effort, and collaborate with 
those communities to apply those approaches desired by the people themselves. We are 
optimistic that this dialogical approach to psychosis in which lived experience is granted 
full ontological reality can facilitate recovery of function in the ordinary, consensual 
world. Each person’s narrative is unique and not necessarily transferable to any other 
person. How people arrive at successful solutions is varied and makes sense only within 
their local context and knowledge communities. 
Lewis Mehl-Madrona    Erik Jul    Barbara Mainguy
Coyote Institute for Studies in Change and Transformation
Augusta, ME, USA
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Until recently, psychiatric practice has tended to label the lived experiences of people diagnosed with psychosis as meaningless hallucinations or 
delusions. Increasingly, however, different perspectives, 
including that of voice hearers themselves, have 
prompted clinicians to wonder whether they might be 
legitimate experiences in consciousness with their own 
ontological validity.  Responsible psychiatric practice 
means attending to increasing evidence for the limits and 
dangers of psychotropic medications. To use medications 
as front line and ongoing treatment means to ignore a 
host of studies that have pointed out limitations in their 
effectiveness (e.g. Schooler, Goldberg, Boothe, & Cole, 
1967; Leff, 1992; Gur et al., 1998; Harrow, 2007). Good 
health outcomes have been achieved differently through 
recent alternatives such as the Maastricht Approach 
(Corstens et al., 2009), the Finnish psychosis project and 
the initiative of Working for Recovery, a Scottish recovery 
house model. More, there has been a recent resurgence 
of interest in Loren Mosher’s Soteria houses, a re-
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examination of the Joseph Burke/RD Laing experimental 
milieu, as well as a greater investment in the possibilities 
of narrative approaches, which has meant an increase 
in hope for a fledgling recovery model of well being for 
those who experience psychosis. With the understanding 
that 1% of the world’s population hears voices, and that 
the management of these voices is possible and has been 
achieved by a growing number of people, symptoms and 
their management can be regarded in a different way, 
leading to more encouraging goals. 
In addition, the first author of this study, 
Lewis Mehl-Madrona, worked with John Weir Perry in 
San Francisco and met him as a supervisor during his 
psychiatric residency. Perry encouraged psychotherapy 
with psychosis and had a prescient understanding of the 
discouraging effects of medicating too soon (J. W. Perry, 
personal communication, 1982).
We present another approach to managing 
symptoms and sustaining quality of life with the kinds 
of symptoms that conventionally receive a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia. In our case, we have undertaken an 
inquiry into a transpersonal approach, which recalls 
Stan Grof ’s spiritual emergency model, but which 
owes its roots more philosophically and practically 
to a construct of mind and consciousness found in 
indigenous thinking.
We introduce a transpersonal model that rests 
upon a belief that the contents of consciousness have 
value, whether or not one can understand them, and that 
extraordinary experiences point toward extraordinary 
realities that are worthy of serious consideration and 
further exploration.  Our dialogic, transpersonal 
approach positions these experiences as valid and 
potentially informative about possible worlds beyond 
ordinary reality. The treatment narrative we use parallels 
the story we tell about consciousness and reported 
transcendental realms–what are they and what can 
they tell us? The belief in the validity of the contents of 
consciousness takes one from a materialistic perspective 
on mind and mental health toward the realm of the 
psychosocial and the existential where what a person says 
and experiences makes sense in the world in which they 
are embedded. In this paper we present one way of many 
in which a psychotherapy for psychosis is developing 
from this perspective, from mutual engrossment by 
practitioner and voice hearer in the phenomenology 
of the experience, understood dialogically through a 
continual conversation of clarification and liberation, 
which becomes, finally, a coherent understanding of the 
experience, and allows for transcendence to the shared 
healing of peers who have been equally wounded.  We 
share some of the outcomes of this work.
Theories of Consciousness.
Hameroff and Penrose (2013) distinguished three broad categories of theories about consciousness 
and its contents.  In the science/materialist view, 
they say, consciousness has no distinctive role: 
“Consciousness is not an independent quality but arose, 
in terms of conventional physical processes, as a natural 
evolutionary consequence of the biological adaptation 
of brains and nervous systems” (Hameroff & Penrose, 
2014, p. 95). Chalmers (2012) opined that consciousness 
is epiphenomenal, lacking independent influence on 
matter with its holder having the illusory belief that it 
matters. In this view, consciousness is not an intrinsic 
feature of the universe. This would be the stance of 
much of contemporary psychiatry, and would allow one 
to ignore the visions and voices of psychosis as so much 
ranting and raving of a disturbed brain, entirely lacking 
in meaning and content. 
The second broad category suggested by 
Hameroff and Penrose (2014) is embodied in the 
views of Descartes in which “consciousness is a 
separate quality, distinct from physical actions and not 
controlled by physical laws, that has always been in the 
universe” (p. 95).   This follows from Kant’s (1781/1998) 
suggestion that consciousness can causally influence 
physical matter and human behavior, but has no basis 
or description in science. In this position, consciousness 
lies outside of science. Some transpersonal theories fall 
into this category, though many would ultimately prefer 
to see science and spirituality linked.  
In the third category, “consciousness results 
from discrete physical events; such events have always 
existed in the universe as non-cognitive, proto-conscious 
events, these acting as part of precise physical laws not 
yet fully understood. Biology evolved a mechanism to 
orchestrate such events and to couple them to neuronal 
activity, resulting in meaningful, cognitive, conscious 
moments and hence also to causal control of behavior” 
(Hameroff & Penrose, 2014, p. 96).  Hameroff and 
Penrose proposed that the moments in which this 
happens are moments in which the quantum wave 
equation is reduced through self-measurement into 
a single state.  In this theory, the Penrose-Hameroff 
theory of orchestrated objective reduction, moments 
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of consciousness occur as terminations of quantum 
computations in brain microtubules, grounding us as 
humans into one consensual reality and its experiential 
qualities. Consciousness is an intrinsic feature of the 
action of the universe and has a legitimate scientific basis 
for being simultaneously non-physical and grounded in 
a world of brains.
For those who agree with Penrose and 
Hameroff, changing the contents of consciousness 
should change brain structure and function. Schwartz 
(2003) demonstrated this using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) for the psychotherapy 
of obsessive-compulsive disorder.  Changes in mind 
reliably and predictably preceded changes in brain 
structure and function. We believe that the brains of 
people with psychosis (and we wonder about dementia) 
can be mitigated through a psychotherapeutic process 
that modulates the contents of consciousness and how 
these are processed and organized.  In Penrose and 
Hameroff’s idea of quantum superposition, the quantum 
wave equation contains all possibilities, but when a 
measurement is taken or an observation made, it is 
possible to see only one.  They have suggested that one 
can oscillate among a variety of actual states, but some 
have more energy and are more entangled with other 
aspects of the environment and are more probable to be 
realized and experienced than others.  
For a variety of reasons (trauma, drugs, spiritual 
journeying without a map), people with psychosis may 
alter those energies and probabilities and find themselves 
experiencing other actualizations and possible worlds 
than what are considered consensual by the rest of 
society.  In this way, these individuals may be seen more 
as adventurers in quantum reality than as patients with 
diseased brains.  Problems arise, however, when awareness 
becomes “stuck” in these other realities, or when these 
persons find themselves perceiving other realities while 
existing in this one.  In such situations they become 
unable to reality test in conventionally expected ways.
From this point of view, the contents and 
descriptions given by people with psychosis become 
fascinating accounts of journeys through time and space 
that many are too grounded in the mundane world to 
experience. As indigenous elders have put it, those with 
psychosis go journeying for the rest of us to worlds that 
we may not want to visit, and they bring back important 
messages, which they themselves cannot necessarily 
decipher. That decoding is left to others to realize.
We have found that it is possible to accept 
the validity of the realities experienced by people 
with psychosis, and to explore ways to integrate those 
experiences and dimensions that allow for management 
of the quotidian tasks of life. This approach celebrates 
the uniqueness and value of their visions, but also calls 
their attention to the importance of being able to manage 
instrumental activities such as shopping, cooking, 
cleaning, and so forth.
Despite being actively practiced by a growing 
range of practitioners (Fenton, 2000; see the listserve 
and website of the International Society for the 
Psychotherapy of Schizophrenia [ISPS]), psychotherapy 
for schizophrenia is not commonly mentioned in 
the psychiatric literature except as a loosely defined, 
supportive case management task (e.g., Wolff et al., 
1997), or as a control condition in studies of other 
interventions (e.g., Hogarty et al., 1997). Many people 
who have been diagnosed with schizophrenia do report 
that psychotherapy was helpful (Coursey, Keller, & 
Farrell, 1995; Hatfield, Gearson, & Coursey, 1996).  Case 
studies (Lysaker & France, 1999; Lysaker & Lysaker, 
in press) and some quantitative research (Glass et al., 
1989; Gunderson et al., 1984) also show benefits from 
psychotherapy. Schooler, Keith, Severe, & Matthews 
(1995) concluded that family treatment provided benefits 
beyond other psychosocial interventions or usual care, 
but that there was no evidence for differences in efficacy 
among family treatments. 
Limits of the 
Materialist Approach to Psychosis
Reliance on a materialist model may explain the lack of emphasis on non-pharmacological approaches. 
If consciousness is epiphenomenal, then changes to 
consciousness would not change brain structure and 
function. Despite Schwartz and a developing literature 
on neuroplasticity (Doidge, 2012), adventures into the 
implications of new understandings happen slowly. 
The pharmaceutical approach has been much 
critiqued in recent years, and became a highly public 
conversation with the advent of a comprehensive review 
of clinical work undertaken by Robert Whitaker (2002, 
2004, 2005, 2007, 2011). In 2002, Whitaker published 
Mad in America, a thoroughly researched account of 
treatment for mental illness in the United States. In it, 
he drew attention to controversy around the reporting 
of studies using neuroleptics, and the continued 
pressure to employ pharmaceutical interventions. In his 
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“Timeline for neuroleptics” (2004, pp. 11-12), and in the 
Whitaker Affidavit (2007), prepared for the Law Project 
for Psychiatric Rights to assist in human rights cases 
launched by self-named psychiatric survivors, Whitaker 
outlined the case against neuroleptics. Whitaker began 
with the common understanding that the modern drug-
centered era began in the 1950s with the introduction 
of chlorpromazine. By 1954 chlorpromazine was 
found to induce symptoms of Parkinson’s disease. In 
1962, the California Mental Hygiene Department 
determined that chlorpromazine and other neuroleptics 
prolonged hospitalization instead of reducing it, but in 
1963, a six-week National Institute of Mental Health 
Psychopharmacology Service Center Collaborative 
Study Group (NIMH; 1964) collaborative study 
concluded that chlorpromazine was a safe and effective 
anti-schizophrenic drug.   Efficacy in the short run 
meant it was potent and effective in removing positive 
symptoms so that clients became more manageable.  A 
conteoraneous NIMH efficacy study indicated at the end 
of six weeks, 75% of patients treated with neuroleptics 
were “much improved” or “very much improved” as 
compared to 23% of the placebo patients (Cole, Klerman, 
& Goldberg, 1964).
Just one year later, these same drugs were found 
to impair learning in humans and animals, potentially 
making it more difficult for socially ostracized people to 
learn how to build healthy relationships (Deniker, 1990). 
A one-year NIMH collaborative study found that drug-
treated patients were more likely than placebo-treated 
patients to be re-hospitalized (Schooler et al., 1967).  In a 
1968 withdrawal study (Prien), researchers at the NIMH 
found that higher dosages received before drug cessation 
were associated with higher relapse rates.  Additionally, 
a 1992 review by the World Health Organization (Leff, 
1992) found that those with first break psychosis who live 
in countries where they were not able to go to a hospital 
and receive neuroleptics were more likely to recover and 
less likely to require further hospitalization.
From early on such results raised concerns that 
neuroleptics might have the potential to make individuals 
more biologically vulnerable to psychosis over the long 
run (Schooler et al., 1967). This finding and possibility 
has been supported by further NIMH studies and implied 
in World Health Organization studies (Jablensky et al., 
1992). It appears an alteration in the dopamine system 
may leave patients with psychosis super-sensitized to 
dopamine, the neurotransmitter believed to mediate the 
brain circuitry involved in psychotic events (Chouinard 
& Jones, 1980; Chouinard, Jones, & Annale, 1978).  
While criticism of these treatments has 
continued to the present (e.g., Whitaker, 2004; Thomas 
et al., 2014), there nevertheless remains a strong tendency 
to medicate the first break with neuroleptics to curb 
acute psychotic symptoms. The individual experiencing 
the psychotic break becomes more manageable with 
decreased positive symptoms.  Yet in addition to the 
concern that neuroleptics may sensitize individuals with 
psychosis to have further breaks in the future, there are 
also numerous other side effects associated with these 
drugs such as weight gain, constipation, blurred vision, 
confusion, and poor memory.  By 1992, a neuroleptic-
induced deficit syndrome was recognized. In addition to 
parkinsonism, akathisia, blunted emotions, and tardive 
dyskinesia, patients treated with neuroleptics suffered 
from increased incidence of blindness, fatal emboli, 
arrhythmia, heat stroke, gynecomastia, galactorrhea, 
obesity, sexual dysfunction, blood dyscrasias, skin 
disorders, seizures, and early death. 
In an often-cited 1994 Harvard study, 
investigators found that schizophrenia outcomes in the 
United States were no better than in the first decades 
of the 20th century and had become worse during the 
twenty years preceding the study (Hegarty, Baldessarini, 
Tohen, Waternaux & Oepen, 1994). In 1995, reported 
relapse rates for schizophrenia patients treated with 
neuroleptics, outside of study conditions, were found 
to be above 80% in the two years following hospital 
discharge, much higher than pre-neuroleptic relapse rates 
(Whitaker, 2004). In 1998, Gur et al. conducted MRI 
studies and discovered neuroleptic-induced hypertrophy 
of the caudate nucleus, the putamen, and the thalamus, 
and atrophy of the frontal and temporal lobe, associated 
with greater severity of both negative and positive 
symptoms. In 1998, Harvard scientists concluded that 
oxidative stress could be the process through which 
neuroleptics cause neuronal damage in the brain (Tsai, 
1998). In that same year, treatment with two or more 
neuroleptics was found to increase risk of early death 
(Joukamaa, 2006; Morgan, 2003).  
Another concern raised discussed the limits of 
testing antipsychotics. Most clinical trials are brief and 
are aimed for obtaining approval for marketing from the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and these brief 
trials may not reflect long-term results (Rosenheck, Swartz, 
& Lieberman, 2006). In recognition of this, NIMH 
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initiated practical clinical trials (PCTs), characterized 
by large diverse and representative samples, prolonged 
treatment, and practical treatment options. Several of 
these PCTs (especially the Clinical Antipsychotic Trials 
in the Intervention Effectiveness or CATIE) focused on 
schizophrenia and evaluated treatment with first- and 
second-generation antipsychotics (McEvoy et al., 2006; 
Stroup et al., 2006). These longitudinal studies found 
that the effectiveness and acceptability of antipsychotic 
drugs varied considerably across the various presentations 
of chronic schizophrenia.  A separate study, in rural 
China, revealed that low doses of medication were as 
effective as high doses with significantly fewer side effects 
(Cun, Shinfuku, Bertolote, Bailly-Salin, & Gittelman, 
2006). Older medications, largely discarded in wealthier 
countries, were as effective as newer, expensive anti-
psychotic drugs. 
Medications proved to be far from the hoped-
for chemical solution, and instead were associated with 
many side-effects, undesirable outcomes, and a growing 
concern from practitioners and consumers that they 
might be doing as much or more harm than good.
Psychosocial Approaches to Psychosis 
Our practice is one in a long tradition of psychosocial approaches to psychosis that have continued 
quietly alongside the strictly pharmaceutical practice. 
Others have provided a comprehensive review of models 
of psychosocial intervention, especially Mosher (1999). 
We will therefore aim rather to show the path through 
which our approach evolved. We trace the origins of 
our thinking about psychosis to Laing, Perry, Mosher, 
Lehninnen and the Finnish Psychosis Project, and to 
indigenous elders.  
We are aware of Stanislav Grof ’s work on 
spiritual emergencies, and feel his approach is useful 
and consistent with our understanding that people who 
have experienced some form of sudden connection to a 
spiritual world may find it unnerving. We certainly feel 
that venturing into that dimension of consciousness 
unguided can be overwhelming and create a crisis.  We 
are not sure, however, that he would explain the realms 
he understands in the way we would, nor that he would 
grant full ontological status to beings encountered in 
another realm. For that awareness, we are more influenced 
by indigenous culture and practice. We are aware of 
Julian Silverman’s (1967) writings on shamanism and 
psychosis. Many indigenous people in North American 
have objected to his description of North American 
cultures as primitive, reflecting an anthropological 
perspective that they consider prejudicial and out of 
date. He described the shaman’s experience as abnormal, 
though concluded that the shaman’s reconstitution of 
self after this abnormal experience was a tribute to the 
power of surrounding community with the experience 
of the schizophrenic reflecting the negative view of 
society toward the experience. He said, “Implicit in 
this formulation is the following basic assumption: the 
often noted overt similarities between the psychotic-
like behaviors of marginally adjusted shamans and of 
acute schizophrenics reflect even more basic identities 
in the cognitive processes that generate these behaviors” 
(Silverman, 1967, p. 21). However, contemporary research 
points toward the healer in such communities as being 
the most stable, instead of marginally adjusted. To 
cultivate an experience of other worlds and to have it 
thrust upon one are quite different experiences. Implicit 
in everything we do is an acceptance of the realm of 
the transpersonal and its contents, and our framework 
for understanding the phenomenology of the psychotic 
experience is grounded in this understanding. 
With sensitivity to the felt sense of psychosis, 
Laing (1967) and his colleagues at Kingsley Hall in 
London generated ideas about how “a community-based, 
supportive, protective, normalizing environment might 
facilitate reintegration without hospitalization” (Mosher, 
1999, pp. 143-144). Mosher (1999) brought this to the 
United States in order to create a place that challenged 
the assumptions, and as he put it, the “degredation, the 
induction and perpetuation of powerlessness, unnecessary 
dependency” (p. 144) that he saw in a medical model 
belief system. Central to these efforts was the acceptance 
and validation of the lived experiences of the clients.  
Mosher (1999) reflected that he was drawn to 
the “phenomenologic/existential thinkers” (e.g., Allers, 
Boss, Hegel, Husserl, Sartre, and Tillich) to create a more 
open-minded, non-categorizing, no-preconceptions 
approach to disturbed and disturbing persons. He 
was also sensitive to the art of the “total institution” 
(Goffman, 1961); he cited “the authoritarianism, the 
degradation ceremonies, the induction and perpetuation 
of powerlessness, unnecessary dependency, labeling, 
and the primacy of institutional needs over those of 
the people ostensibly served—the patients” (Mosher, 
1999, p. 8). Power and its politics were always a part 
of Mosher’s perspective, inspiring us to aspire for non-
hierarchical services.  Mosher (1999) wrote:
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Despite being trained by psychopharmacologic 
icons (e.g., Dr. Gerald Klerman), I somehow never 
found a Lazarus among those I treated with the 
major tranquilizers. Again, my experience led me 
to question the emerging psychopharmacologic 
domination of the treatment of very disturbed and 
disturbing persons. Actually those persons seemed 
to appreciate my sometimes, clumsy attempts to 
understand them and their lives. Because I hadn’t 
found a large role for drugs in the helping process, 
I was led to believe more in interpersonal than 
neuroleptic “cures.” (p. 3)
Mosher refined Laing’s ideas to create the Soteria 
Project, an alternative to hospitalization. This project’s 
design was a random assignment, two-year follow-up 
study comparing the Soteria method of treatment with 
“usual” general hospital psychiatric ward interventions 
for persons newly diagnosed as having schizophrenia 
and deemed in need of hospitalization. It has been 
extensively reported (see especially Mosher & Menn, 
1978; Mosher, Vallone, & Menn, 1995). In addition to 
less than 30 days previous hospitalization (i.e., “newly 
diagnosed”), the Soteria study selected 18- to 30-year-old 
unmarried subjects about whom three independent raters 
could agree met DSM-2 criteria for schizophrenia and 
who were experiencing at least four of seven Bleulerian 
symptoms of the disorder.  The early onset (18 to 30 
years) and marital status criteria were designed to identify 
a subgroup of persons diagnosed with schizophrenia who 
were at statistically high risk for long-term disability. 
Mosher described the Soteria method as the 24 
hour a day application of interpersonal, phenomenological 
interventions by a nonprofessional staff, usually without 
drug treatment, in the context of a small, homelike, quiet, 
supportive, protective, and tolerant social environment. 
The core practice of interpersonal phenomenology 
focused on the development of a nonintrusive, non-
controlling but actively empathetic relationship with 
the psychotic person without having to do anything 
explicitly therapeutic or controlling. He characterized 
it as “being with,” “standing by attentively,” “trying to 
put your feet into the other person’s shoes,” or “being 
an LSD trip guide.” He aimed to develop, over time, a 
shared experience of the meaningfulness of the client’s 
individual social context—current and historical. 
No formal therapeutic “sessions” occurred at Soteria. 
Therapy took place there as staff built bridges, over 
time, between individuals’ emotionally disorganized 
states to the life events that seemed to have precipitated 
their psychological disintegration. The context within 
the house was one of positive expectations that 
reorganization and reintegration would occur as a 
result of these seemingly minimalist interventions. This 
context of expecting recovery proves powerful as we 
are noticing in our current pain research (Mainguy & 
Mehl-Madrona, 2013).
The original Soteria House opened in 1971. 
A replication facility (“Emanon”) opened in 1974 in 
another suburban San Francisco Bay Area city. The 
project first published systematic one-year outcome data 
in 1974 and 1975 (Mosher & Menn, 1974; Mosher, 
Menn, & Matthews, 1975). Despite the publication of 
consistently positive results (Mosher & Menn, 1978; 
Matthews, Roper, Mosher, & Menn, 1979) for this 
subgroup of newly diagnosed psychotic persons from the 
first cohort of subjects (1971-1976), the Soteria Project 
ended in 1983. Due to lack of funding, data from the 
1976-1983 cohort were not analyzed until 1992. 
Results were clear that alternatives to acute 
psychiatric hospitalization are as, or more, effective 
than traditional hospital care in short-term reduction of 
psychopathology and longer social adjustment, especially 
if the patient was without extensive hospitalization. 
Patients with less than 30 days of hospitalization were 
especially responsive to the positive therapeutic effects of 
the well-defined, Soteria-type special social environment.
A number of approaches to treat psychosis 
while minimizing medication have arisen in recent 
years. The Finnish Psychosis Project emerged from the 
work of Yriii Alanen  and colleagues (Alanen, Lehtinen, 
Lehtinen, Aaltonen, & Räkköläinen, 1999), which 
minimizes medication and emphasizes teamwork, 
basic psychotherapeutic attitude, family-centeredness 
and need-specificity. Holma and Aaltonen (1998) 
described a narrative understanding of acute psychoses 
through hermeneutical premises.  According to their 
colleague Giddens (1993), this hermeneutical approach 
is predicated on four premises: 
1) An object has to be understood in its own terms, 
that is, as a subject. The other has the authentic right 
to take his or her role in a dialogue as a full and equal 
partner. This is the premise of hermeneutical auton-
omy and guides our work with voices and the beings 
behind those voices.
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2) An object has to be understood in context and it is 
through this that meaningful coherence is generated. 
Hence, we strive to understand the context of the be-
ing of the voice and the context in which our patient 
has come to intersect with that being’s world.
3) Understanding has to conform to the actuality of 
the experience of the interpreter, so-called pre-un-
derstanding. All understanding demands some mea-
sure of pre-understanding whereby further under-
standing becomes possible. 
4) The interpretation of a human product or action 
must be adequate in relation to the intentions of its 
originator.  Though we may question the conclusions 
a person makes about the beings behind his or her 
voices, we never question the validity of the person’s 
experience.
Holma and Aaltonen (1998) constructed mutual 
understanding through conversation with the individual 
with psychosis.  It was vital to their success that the patient 
was brought into a dialogue where the meanings of the 
events they experienced were socially co-constructed.   
They asserted that diagnosis in the traditional way 
seemed less essential in the treatment of psychosis than 
understanding the individual’s situation through the 
story he or she was telling through action and speech.   
Consonant with Narrative Cognitive-Behavior Therapy 
(NCBT), the individual should be taken as a valuable 
participant in social relationships and not marginalized 
as psychotic or sick.  As Hippocrates said, it is more 
important to understand the person who has the illness, 
than to know what sort of illness the person has.
In 1997, Aaltonen and colleagues published 
results of their approach. (Alanen et al., 1999). The 
two-year outcome of two groups of consecutive 
patients (total N  =  106) with first-episode functional 
non-affective psychosis was compared, both treated 
according to the need-specific Finnish model, which 
stressed teamwork, patient and family participation, 
and basic psychotherapeutic attitudes. The two study 
groups differed in the use of neuroleptics: three of 
the sites (the experimental group) used a minimal 
neuroleptic regime whilst the other three (the control 
group) used neuroleptics according to the usual practice. 
Total time spent in hospital, occurrence of psychotic 
symptoms during the last follow-up year, employment, 
GAS score and the Grip on Life assessment were used 
as outcome measures. In the experimental group 42.9% 
of the patients did not receive neuroleptics at all during 
the whole two-year period, while the corresponding 
proportion in the control group was 5.9%. The overall 
outcome of the whole group was favorable. The outcome 
of the experimental group was equal or better than 
that of the control group, after controlling for age, 
gender, and diagnosis. This indicates that an integrated 
approach, stressing intensive psychosocial measures, can 




The World Health Organization’s International Pilot Study on Schizophrenia commenced in 1967 to 
establish whether or not schizophrenia could be found in 
all countries and whether it could be reliably diagnosed 
and treated.  The study quickly affirmed that the diagnosis 
could be made everywhere. Gradually, however, the 
researchers noticed that patients in poor nations had 
better outcomes than those in wealthier nations. This 
led to a second study with more rigorous guidelines that 
tracked about 3,300 patients with 30-year follow-ups in 
12 countries—capitalist and communist, Eastern and 
Western, Northern and Southern, large and small, rich 
and poor. Again, patients in poorer countries spent fewer 
days in hospitals, were more likely to be employed, and 
were more socially connected (Ganev, Onchev, & Ivanov, 
1998). Between half and two-thirds became symptom-
free, whereas only about a third of patients from rich 
countries recovered to the same degree (Sartorius, 1992). 
Nigerian, Colombian, and Indian patients were less 
likely to suffer relapses and had longer periods of health 
in between. Doctors in poorer countries stopped drugs 
when patients became better, whereas doctors in rich 
countries often required patients to take medication all 
their lives.  Psychotic disorders have better prognoses in 
developing countries, with higher remission rates 
Vedantam, a journalist, wrote a series of articles 
for the Washington Post in 2005, showcasing the results 
of the World Health Organization’s schizophrenia study. 
He shared this story:
Psychiatrist Naren Wig crossed an open sewer, 
skirted a pond and, in the dusty haze of afternoon, 
saw something miraculous. Krishna Devi, a woman 
he had treated years ago for schizophrenia, sat in a 
courtyard surrounded by religious pictures, exposed 
brick walls and drying laundry. Devi had stopped 
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taking medication long ago, but her articulate 
speech and easy smile were eloquent testimony that 
she had recovered from the debilitating disease. Few 
schizophrenia patients in the United States are so 
lucky, even after years of treatment. But Devi had 
hidden assets: a doting family and an embracing 
village that never excluded her from social events, 
family obligations and work. Devi is a living 
reminder of a remarkable three-decade-long study 
by the World Health Organization—one that many 
Western doctors initially refused to believe: People 
with schizophrenia, a deadly illness characterized 
by hallucinations, disorganized thinking and 
social withdrawal, typically do far better in poorer 
nations such as India, Nigeria and Colombia than 
in Denmark, England and the United States.  The 
astounding result calls into question one of the 
central tenets of modern psychiatry: that a “brain 
disease” such as schizophrenia is best treated by 
hospitals, drugs and biomedical interventions. (n.p.)
In 1992, The World Health Organization 
concluded that living in a developed nation was a “strong 
predictor” that the patient would never fully recover 
(Jablensky et al., 1992).   The better outcome in poorer 
countries was explained by stronger family ties, which 
have a profound impact on recovery, and the lack of 
neuroleptic medication available in developed nations.  
Vedantam (2005) observed that
most people with schizophrenia in India live with 
their families or in other social networks—in sharp 
contrast to the United States, where most patients 
are homeless, in group homes or on their own, in 
psychiatric facilities or in jail. Many Indian patients 
are given low-stress jobs by a culture that values 
social connectedness over productivity; patients in 
the United States are usually excluded from regular 
workplaces.  Indian families sit in on doctor-patient 
discussions because families are considered central 
to the problem and the solution. In America, 
doctor-patient conversations are confidential—and 
psychiatrists primarily focus on brain chemistry…. 
“Social factors play a major and important role in 
the outcome of disease,” Sartorius, head of the study, 
said. “Very few solutions are medical in medicine.” 
… “Social factors are more important than my 
drug,” said  Jose Bertolote, a WHO psychiatrist. 
 Indian psychiatrists, unlike their Western 
counterparts, dispense not only drugs but also spiritual 
advice, family counseling, and even matchmaking 
services. In the south Indian city of Chennai, 
psychiatrist Shantha Kamath writes prescriptions for 
better family ties: When a father asked for her help 
in arranging the marriage of his daughter, who had 
schizophrenia, Kamath’s written  instructions told 
the parents how to interact with their daughter and 
listed the skills the young woman needed to learn 
before the doctor would arrange a match. (n.p.)
In country after country, WHO found 
that strong social and family connections trumped 
pharmacology (Leff, 1992).  
Dr. Narendra Wig’s psychiatric hospital in the 
northern Indian city of Chandigarh could not afford to 
pay nurses (Vedantam, 2005). Out of necessity, families 
stayed with patients 24 hours a day. Relatives became the 
nurses, which turned out to be more effective than nurses 
(especially at calming agitated patients) and persists today. In 
India, odd behavior is no reason to isolate someone. Patients 
with a schizophrenia diagnosis worked, got married, and 
had children. Relatives and neighbors helped and people 
got better. Wig (2004) was described as mostly telling his 
patients about religious figures who overcame obstacles in 
a kind of naturalistic narrative therapy. He never described 
schizophrenia as a chronic, incurable brain disease. He 
encouraged patients to complement his treatment with 
faith-healing techniques. Social connectedness for patients 
is seen as so important that the psychiatrists tell families 
to secretly give money to employers so that patients can be 
given fake jobs, work regular hours and have the satisfaction 
of getting  “paid”—practices that would be unethical, even 
illegal, in the United States. 
Since 1970s it has been known that the 
neuroscience findings in what is called “schizophrenia” 
are largely overlapping with the neuroscience findings 
found in states of chronic stress, childhood maltreatment 
(sexual, physical and emotional abuse or neglect), 
social isolation, and social defeat. The developmental 
traumatology research convincingly demonstrates 
causality beyond correlation of the effects of relational 
traumas and chronic, profound stress on the nervous 
system, which is something the proponents of “psychosis” 
as a neurobiological condition have failed to do. 
In support of this position, two NIMH 
researchers wrote that, 
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Schizophrenia, of course, is not something someone 
has; it is a diagnosis someone is given. It is worth 
considering that the syndrome of schizophrenia 
is not a disease at all, but a state of brain function 
based on an altered developmental trajectory from 
early programming with changing repercussions 
throughout life...That there appear to be numerous 
genetic and environmental factors that can contribute 
in various combinations to this recognizable state of 
altered brain function further suggests that what we 
call schizophrenia may represent “not the result of 
a discrete event or illness process at all, but rather 
one end of the developmental spectrum that for 
genetic and other reasons approximately 0.5% of 
the population will fall into.” (Weinberger & Levitt, 
2011, p. 408)
This shift in thinking opens up the possibilities and 
the necessities for new thinking about psychosis and 
validates the importance of the investigation of the 
phenomenology of the experience.
Phenomenology of Psychosis
We are approaching the conceptualization of psychosis and other unusual states of mind 
from a phenomenological perspective.  Phenomenology 
attempts to describe and explore the reported experiences 
of others. What is it like for that person? How is his or 
her psychosis experienced? We want to understand these 
experiences in their naturally occurring complexity and 
wholeness (Rhodes & Jakes, 2009). Two topics within 
phenomenology are particularly salient. The first is the 
understanding of the self and sense of agency, and the 
description of who the agent might be. The second is the 
experience of the everyday world within the agents’ lives.  
In our work, we are also concerned with the being of 
the other—of the being behind a voice or the being of a 
vision and are seeking a description of these beings and 
the worlds in which they live.
Laing (1960) described the sense of discomfort 
in the world experienced by those with psychosis and 
labeled it “ontological insecurity.”  He believed that 
people who experience psychosis never adequately 
developed a secure sense of self. Perhaps the insecurity 
relates more to the recognition of the spaces between 
moments of consciousness and the relative arbitrariness 
of which world comes into our focus.  When one 
grants full ontological status to the voices inside their 
head, there is a way in which one can never go back to 
being the in-control character. Rather, that which one 
recognizes as “me,” the being constructed to be one’s 
identity, mediates among the other characters who come 
to occupy the territory of the mind. For people who 
have been traumatized, some of these characters can be 
terrifying, occupying spaces and worlds emphasizing fear 
and danger.  When minds intersect with these spaces, 
ontological insecurity is inevitable. 
Behind the symptoms of psychosis there is a 
felt sense of change by the individual, an alteration of 
the experience of self, self with others, and self in the 
world, which is a persistent and profound concern for 
the individual (Rhodes & Jakes, 2009). This probing 
of emic perspective is based on accounts of individuals 
experiencing psychosis, people who relate their 
experience of not feeling like themselves anymore. They 
cannot act or talk to others as they used to. They are not 
the same person, as if the main character in their lives 
was usurped of identity in various degrees. They are no 
longer grounded in the ordinary consensual world in 
the same way as others, who must work hard through 
spiritual practices and other means to obtain similar 
visions that come quickly and easily to those diagnosed 
with psychosis. On the other hand, this slower 
approach seems to be associated with more positive 
experiences that are enhancing to lives in the ordinary 
world, while people with psychosis who are on the fast 
track to visions more often appear to have negative 
experiences.
Psychotherapy of Psychosis
The psychotherapy of psychosis involves, then, using an equitable dialogical approach to create 
a healing story in the tradition of White and Epston 
(1990) in which the terrifying characters and emotions 
are contained and managed. We aim to help people 
settle into a lived world in a more syntonic manner.   
People with psychosis can learn to function better in 
this ordinary world even as they perceive and interact 
with extraordinary worlds.  In this way, we externalize 
the problem and revise the person’s relationships with the 
problem. In our work with narrative, which we accept 
as the framework for meaning-making, we believe 
we enhance their frontal lobe function, those areas 
concerned with story, so that people become better able 
to error detect, do theory of mind (of others), inhibit 
extraneous responses (orbitofrontal cortex), and predict 
consequences. Building better stories means building 
better judgment.
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Oft described, though difficult to put into words, 
are a wide range of alterations in perception of things, 
time, and space (Rhodes & Jakes, 2009) that come to 
those with psychosis and may be explainable by Penrose 
and Hameroff’s theories of consciousness. Being in the 
world seems different to those experiencing psychosis.   
Rules inherent to those grounded in reality are not so 
apparent.  In our approach, we accept unquestioningly 
the reality of people’s lived experience, even as we 
focus on how to have extraordinary experiences and 
still function in the ordinary world. We try to restore 
the lost or shaken natural attitude, common sense, or 
what Minkowski  (1927) called the “vital contact with 
reality,” so that life can happen more seamlessly (Sass, 
2001).  Rhodes and Gipps (2008) have described this 
alteration in perception as a “background” disturbance.  
Individuals with psychosis experience the surrounding 
world differently, whether temporary or permanent, 
specific or global in scope (Rhodes & Jakes, 2009).  
This perspective on psychosis is compatible with 
many indigenous cultures.  Health care providers and 
institutions supporting their work have a predominately 
etic perspective of psychosis because they are not 
experiencing it.  An emic perspective of psychosis is 
harder to attain and even more difficult to deliver. One 
has to be willing to enter into the lived experience of the 
client and grant it validity. There can often be confusion 
generated because of differences of experience between 
those helping and those in need of help.  
Outcome research is somewhat limited. 
Okuzawa et al. (2014) reviewed studies on cognitive-
behavior therapy for people at high risk for psychosis 
and found six qualifying studies with a total of 800 
participants. Three trials achieved a significant effect. 
The two trials that employed cognitive behavior therapy 
enhanced for the specialized needs of clinical high-risk 
patients maintained significant effects at post-treatment 
follow up. They concluded that “evidence from recent 
trials suggest that cognitive behavior therapy may be 
beneficial in delaying or preventing onset of psychosis in 
clinical high-risk individuals.
Treatment Philosophy.
Our philosophy of approach follows that of 
Rhodes & Jakes (2009) with the following features:
• Focus on solutions, resources, and strengths of the 
individual 
• Prefer solutions generated by clients with respect for 
their inherent creativity 
• Investigate unique outcomes and exceptions to the 
client’s illness story 
• Assume that the individual exists in a network of in-
fluences, both historical and contextual 
• Use non-technical terms for difficulties 
• Emphasize language, metaphor, narration, and dis-
course 
• Be open to theories such as: neurology, phenomenol-
ogy, developmental theory etc., but also the theories 
of indigenous people and of the clients themselves.
• Focus on constructing together a healing narrative.
• Make little to no attempt to educate 
• Use the imagination to build a full picture of a pre-
ferred future 
• Combine assessment and intervention into one pro-
cess 
• Maintain a holistic model of causation 
• Radical acceptance of the contents of the psychosis 
experience, such that mitigating ideas are presented 
in a way consistent with the metaphors being of-
fered.
We applied these narrative practices in a locked 
inpatient psychiatric facility (Mehl-Madrona, 2005) 
applying concepts from Vassallo’s (1998) case report 
of a narrative group for seriously mental ill, seeking to 
challenge “normalizing judgments,” defined as practices 
that evaluate and classify people and relationships 
according to the truths of a dominant culture. In this case, 
the dominant culture is the psychiatric establishment 
and the day-to-day practice of categorizing people, 
labeling the manner of their defect, and then providing 
specific biological therapies (medications) in accordance 
with current pharmacological theories about what would 
work for this particular defect in biology and genetics.  
Working with Anthony’s (1993) ideas of 
recovery, we conducted groups from the perspective that 
people can improve without professional help and that 
professionals do not necessarily hold the key to recovery. 
The individuals do.  We believed that a common 
denominator of recovery is the presence of people who 
expect recovery with confidence as they bear witness to 
the suffering of the individual. Community is a more 
than adequate substitute for the mental health system.   
In the group we challenged the dominant cultural story 
of people’s brains being defectiveness as the cause of their 
chronic mental illness. Implementation of our approach 
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improved outcomes compared to other units in the 
hospital that continued to function in the conventional 
manner. We wanted to make some progress in moving 
from an expert driven model (implicit in everything 
about how hospitals function) to co-constructed models 
arising from all concerned with the person who suffers.
What we are doing is making story together, 
which is how we construct shared meanings. We create 
and maintain our stories about how things work and 
what they mean in dialogue with others. Through our 
relationships and the stories told in those relationships, 
we also construct and maintain an identity (which is 
a story about who we are), which has more or less of a 
sense of personal agency. Shotter (1993) has called this 
dialogical or conversational social constructionism, 
which is the idea that we co-create each other through 
our responsive understanding and the communication of 
that understanding to each other. Hence, in our work 
with psychosis, we are trying to create an accepting 
community of mutual understanding and influencing of 
each other’s stories in which all utterances have validity, 
regardless of how fantastic (or boring) some may be. 
Diminishing the Expert and Peer Helping
We aimed to diminish the role of the professional 
as expert.  Though an event occurs, the meaning attributed 
to the event is salient, since meaning is constructed by 
all participants in the event. The expert paradigm can be 
appropriate to certain degrees and offer benefit.  However, 
the implicit power differential between expert provider 
and recipient of care in the patient position can leave the 
patient’s perspective marginalized, and can inure the care 
provider to the importance of the relationship with the 
patient and to the validity of lived experience. This can 
seriously impede socialization and recovery for the person 
diagnosed with psychosis. Additionally, the care provider’s 
constructions of reality are offered more credence, which 
can be ontologically dangerous.   
When the expert model becomes more flexible 
and allows other stakeholders, primarily the patient, to 
have a voice, the patient and the healthcare system can 
benefit.  Hermeneutics and dialectics are ways to allow 
more and varied stakeholders into the system (Heppner, 
Wampold, & Kivlighan, 2008). Hermeneutics refers to 
the activity of discovery and interpretation of individual 
human thought.  This method is vital in developing 
an interpretation of the experience of someone with 
psychosis, and moves us toward a helping and healing 
relationship.  The interaction between caregiver and 
patient can be described as dialectical.  Dialectics are 
expressed and developed through conversation with the 
patient, and with the sharing of interpretations of the 
patient’s experience once rapport has been established.  The 
power of dialectics emerges as our mutual understanding 
changes as we share our interpretation of conversations 
in which all stakeholders participate.  In the dialectical 
relationship, the patient is given credit for being a human 
with rights of autonomy, active in creating his or her own 
new experience.   This differs from the expert medical 
model, which can be characterized as a mostly linear flow 
of information and power, in being a relationship that is 
recursive and engaging of both parties.   
In conventional psychiatry, illness is “discovered” 
by experts through documentation of a certain number 
of symptoms that can be theoretically, objectively 
verified or falsified. These definitions are codified within 
the DSM (APA, 2000).  A radically different approach, 
which would be non-hierarchical, can be derived from 
philosophers such as Bakhtin (Clark & Holquist, 
1984), Volosinov (Shotter, 2004) and Medvedev (The 
Bakhtin Center, 2004), all of whom tried to account for 
human behavior socially: by looking at how individuals 
relate when communicating. For them, dialogue is the 
medium whereby people create and sustain their ways 
of living together—the glue for co-existing. For them, 
psychosis would arise through sustained patterns of 
communication. In our view, voices encountered are 
also part of that dialogue and should participate in the 
meaning-making about themselves.
The terminology of conventional psychiatry 
(including the wording of the diagnostic criteria for 
psychosis), and the operations defined as treatment, gives 
the clinician privilege and authority in making decisions 
about the patient. It is up to the clinician to determine 
what is clinically significant, what questions to ask, 
what stressors to consider, and what areas to explore, 
leaving the patient with a prescription for medication 
and behavior, and rarely engaging him or her in a 
problem-solving dialogue. Foucault (1969) wrote about 
the means by which languages of knowledge legitimatize 
the consolidation of power in one group (psychiatrists) 
over another group (patients), with the smaller group 
explaining and defining the larger group’s reality. 
Richard Bernstein (1985) wrote, “It is our 
cultural understanding of science, especially the physical 
sciences, and the remarkable ‘success’ of the scientific 
enterprise since its modern origins that has set the context 
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for the intellectual and cultural problems in the modern 
world…there are deep cultural reasons and causes—as 
Gadamer, Arendt, and Habermas have argued—why in 
the modern world the only concept of reason that seems 
to make sense is one in which we think of reason as an 
instrument for determining the most efficient or effective 
means to a determinate end, and why the only concept of 
activity that seems viable is one of technical application, 
manipulation, and control” (p. 46). This appears to 
explain the motivation driving contemporary psychiatry. 
However, as Whitaker (2011) pointed out, that approach 
is not actually working very well.
Carving out the Continual Conversation
In Bakhtin’s perspective, humans live in 
continual conversation (including internal conversations) 
with actual or anticipated others. In our conversations 
we are continually negotiating what we mean.  The 
signs and symptoms labeled psychosis result from these 
conversations, perhaps even as misunderstandings.   
Mikhail Bakhtin’s philosophical orientation concerning 
dialogue and difference is captured in a methodological 
application called “dialogism,” which offers a significant 
challenge to contemporary medical practice and its 
location within authoritative discourse (White, 2014). 
According to Bakhtin, dialogue, as an antidote to 
monologism generates difference and, as a consequence, 
has the potential to expand the capacity to cross cultural 
and individual borders in a process called transgression 
(Holquist, 2009)
Bakhtin’s optimistic view (White, 2014) 
rendered each human being into an author who works 
hard all the time at co-authoring with others to have 
good relationships. Psychosis in its most symptomatic 
form could be seen as a breakdown in co-authorship.   
The person in a psychotic state loses the ability to draw 
on words and ways of speaking (discourses) to make 
sense to others, to make requests of others, to repair 
disrupted conversations, and so on. But, thinkers like 
Bakhtin would see the psychotic conversation, even 
as monologue, as valid and important. This makes 
conversation an infinite challenge. A conversational view 
of psychosis would argue that pharmacotherapy is one 
type of conversation, but there are others.  The question 
of which conversation to hear would move toward issues 
of practicality and preference. 
The project of modern medicine is to have 
complete, correct knowledge of disease (defined as 
physiological and within individual biological entities), to 
have evidence-based best treatment recommendations, 
and, in essence, to tell people what to do to get healthy 
and stay healthy. This is also the goal of most of 
alternative medicine, though the methods differ. The 
larger question which some would like to consider, is the 
question of whether or not this is possible. Within what 
is coming to be called narrative medicine, it is possible to 
inquire about the long-term socio-cultural and biological 
effects of applying the biomedical expert model, and 
about whether or not biology exists independent of 
culture.  Within the conventional psychiatric model, 
culture is an add-on, an after-thought, something to 
be addressed once the biological factors have been 
considered and addressed. It may also be that culture 
drives biology and biology shapes culture so much that 
the two are inseparable. 
Does the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual add anything to 
contemporary mental health treatment? Recently 
Thomas Insel (2013), Director of the National Institute 
of Mental Health, rejected the DSM as a stand-alone 
valid classification tool, since it has no grounding in 
biology.  However, it is culturally created and creative of 
culture.  With its continual “further specification” and 
“fine-tuning” of diagnostic criteria, it aims to classify 
people into finer and finer distinctions. Many agree 
that it justifies and perpetuates a massive and powerful 
industry, which perpetually revises itself. Someone from 
another culture or theoretical, diagnostic system might 
argue that this massive investment in the classification 
of disorders produces and reifies the problems that it sets 
out to study. These people might say of DSM what Jung 
(1939/1966) said of Freud, that Freud (and, arguably, the 
psychiatric industry) 
constantly had the clinical picture of neurosis before 
the mind’s eye—the very attitude that makes people 
ill and prevents them from being healthy. Anyone 
who has this picture before him always sees the flaw 
in everything, and however much he may struggle 
against it, he must always point out what these 
demonically obsessive pictures compel him to see” 
(p. 45). 
Rom Harre (personal communication, June 23, 
2004) noted that, 
Most of the people who have the gall to declare 
some practice to be unscientific have a very primitive 
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idea of what science is.   Science is not a series of 
discourses arranged by deductive logic. It is a cluster 
of practices at the core of which is classification of 
phenomena and the making of models. 
 The positivist idea of “science” may have done 
harm to psychology, not least because people thought 
there must be “measurers,” numbers, experiments, 
variables and so on, and took on statistics as a way of 
meeting this “obligation.” 
 Even in the biological sciences, there are many 
complex phenomena that cannot be reduced or 
deduced down in artificial experimentation that take 
out external validity factors, or as you say, there are 
many uncertainties and complexities of physics. 
 We are wondering about alternative voices to 
bring to the table of explaining human behavior.   
Bakhtin was fond of Dostoevsky’s ways of bringing 
forth the “voices” of his characters without giving 
any voice supremacy. Bakhtin defined polyphony 
as “a plurality of independent and unmerged voices 
and consciousnesses” leading to multiple—if not 
infinite—potential meanings depending upon whom 
is participating in the creation of that meaning. One 
voice (as truth) is monologue, a stifling of those 
dialogic potentials.  
We would prefer to arrive at something holding 
the social role of truth through consensus, and propose 
that the voices stifled by contemporary psychiatry should 
be included. The more voices, the better, since meaning 
arises as the product of multiple voices in a continuous 
dialogue that never arrives at any final conclusion. This is 
what we are also proposing for the voices that exist within 
the mind. Meaning is an accomplishment constructed 
through communication, including the communication 
with the inner voice. They have something to add to the 
communication that creates meaning, as do the voices 
of the community in which the sufferer finds himself 
or herself. Creative understanding is an unending 
process whereby dialogue creates that which is shared 
and different about people. This is why many are 
uncomfortable with the current biological emphasis in 
psychiatry—it eliminates large blocks of voices from the 
dialogue. 
Alternative health practitioners, or clinicians 
and communities whose theories differ from the official 
version, might miss out. An alternative way of constructing 
any mental disorder is by listening to so-called patients in 
a way that is confident enough to co-create a different 
story than the official, diagnostic version. 
What happens when one operates on this 
idea that all human experience is valid, including the 
extraordinary? What happens when each person is 
approached with respect and curiosity? Regardless of 
how much difficulty a person has negotiating his or her 
way through the ordinary world, their non-ordinary 
experiences can be profound, potentially replete with 
wisdom and guidance for others, and revealing of other 
unexamined dimensions of lived experience. 
Preliminary Report on Outcomes
Sufficient clinical work has been done to warrant preliminary reporting of clinical outcomes. The 
report summarizes the work of two of the authors 
(LMM and BJM) who have interacted over time with 
51 consecutive qualifying patients diagnosed (elsewhere) 
with a psychotic disorder. Patients are only included in 
this reporting if they had stayed with us for at least six 
months. (During this same time period, 201 patients 
came who did not stay for six months of treatment.) 
Diagnoses included schizophrenia, bipolar disorder with 
psychotic features, psychosis not otherwise specified, and 
schizoaffective disorder. 
Baseline questionnaires were administered to all 
participants. These consisted of the Positive and Negative 
Syndrome Scale (PNSS; Kay, Fiszbein, & Opfer, 1987), 
the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS; Overall & 
Gorham, 1962), the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale 
(Ham-D; Williams, 1988), the Montgomery-Åsberg 
Depression Rating Scale (MADRS; Müller, Himmerich, 
Kienzle, & Szegedi, 2003), the Clinical Global Inventory 
(CGI; Guy, 1976), and the BASIS-24 (Eisen, Normand, 
Belanger, Spiro, & Esch, 2004). These questionnaires 
were re-administered at quarterly intervals.
Table 1 shows the diagnoses for patients who 
began doing narrative therapy with the authors along 
with the average length of follow-up. What is clear is 
that the narrative psychotherapy of psychosis is a long-
term proposition, typically measured in years rather than 
weeks or months. Yet the failure rate in this sample is low 
(7.8%), as is the number of patients requiring ongoing 
medication (9.8%). Over 60% of patients had resolution 
of symptoms without any medication, and over 20% of 
patients required only low dose medication.
Table 2 shows changes occurring in some basic 
outcome measures over the course of treatment.  The 
results clearly show that most people who stick with the 
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approach (for whatever reason) do largely improve on 
all baseline measures.  However, the caveat is embodied 
in the question, why do so many people not continue? 
Potential answers include the reality that psychotherapy 
is work and much of contemporary culture socializes 
people to want quick solutions to health issues, often 
in the form of a pill that does not require effort. It 
may also be that the more severe cases are not able to 
build sufficient rapport to persevere for six months in 
psychotherapy.
Clinical Cases
Consider as an example a woman whom DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) would classify as psychotically 
depressed. This woman, however, interpreted her 
“illness” as a sign from God that she should stop her heavy 
involvement with her local church, quit employment, 
retreat, and be ill for a certain period of time. Nearing 
the end of her time of rest, she felt vindicated, she 
wanted to talk, and she sought therapeutic help in the 
form of counseling and group therapy. She did not 
want to discuss the symptoms in any great detail, and 
was more interested in finding out how other people 
experienced her in an interpersonal setting. She felt the 
need to consult with therapeutic professionals, to talk, 
and seemed to value this experience. Yet this process 
did not replace or heal her withdrawal, perhaps because 
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she did not regard her actions during that period of 
her life as particularly disordered. Quite the opposite, 
in retrospect—whatever it was, whatever it did—it 
appeared to be the right thing.  Her story differed from 
the conventionally accepted story. Improvement came 
when God was allowed to speak and to declare what her 
experience had meant and for those bearing witness to 
her story to accept her interpretation.
Another woman, Betsy, presented with visions 
of a big buffalo head. She saw two big horns and a huge 
buffalo robe. She would climb on top of this buffalo, on 
top of his head, and stand on his hump to see further than 
she could see on her own. Her little sister periodically 
appeared. A cousin had abused Betsy sexually when she 
was ages 4 to 6, and she had come to believe that this 
defined her. Her abuse stopped with the sudden death 
of her brother.  She felt guilty, for perhaps her brother 
had died for her. This led to an uncomfortable stillness.  
She could feel the hands of her brother. They felt “really 
weird, hard and not cold, not supple, though looking 
soft.” She knew he wasn’t there, but his hands were. His 
hands were at room temperature when she had touched 
him in the casket and this had disturbed her. She was 
thirteen then.  In the year before seeing me, she had 
experienced a recurrent dream of waking up in shallow 
water in the early morning with the sun overhead. She 
often had dreams of breathing underwater. Something 
grabbed her by the collar and pulled her out of the 
water, telling her to go. She believed it was a leopard-
jaguar combination animal.  She remembered going 
back and forth, in and out of her body. She remembered 
the incredible stillness of being outside her body.  She 
felt a bubble around her, a bubble of stillness. Then she 
was one with a large ocean turtle on an expedition into 
the ocean’s depths to find a sacred pearl. She practiced 
breathing for this long journey in the dark with only a 
few glimpses of moonlight.  
When we discussed this, Betsy told me she was 
from a star. She had to twist herself into uncomfortable 
shapes when she came to earth to relate to people. These 
shapes were not her.  She had to go back to the stars to 
feel her power. She remembered being at a health club 
on the ocean in which the warmth of the sun passed 
through the glass and the seagulls lined up outside.  It 
was early morning and the sun was overhead.  She felt 
someone grabbing her by the collar and pulling her 
through the window and into the water. She rose up to 
return to being a star. She felt the power within her.  
She talked about her mother dying two years 
previously. She had never grieved her mother’s passing.  
There had always been so much fury between them. In 
her vision she saw a bear in the woods. The bear was 
related to her but also separate.  It was talking about 
powers she didn’t have yet but could get, evolving 
energies.  
Improvement came when we created a dialogue 
with all these internal characters from her visions and 
dreams in which each spoke for itself. We used puppets 
to represent these characters and placed them around 
a table. Each was allowed to speak until all came to a 
negotiated compromise that included the actual physical 
people who also shared her life.
A third patient believed that he was cancer 
embodied. His agency at causing death for others made 
him feel alive.  He was a burning funeral pyre, aware 
that he would die, but going out in a glorious manner.  
He perceived himself as having been in a great battle 
and having fought valiantly, but having been mortally 
wounded.  He wore his wound proudly as a burning 
flame, his badge of courage, his purple heart. We were 
able to let the cancer speak and to allow him to negotiate 
with it and with other characters who didn’t want him 
to be cancer embodied to arrive at a more satisfactory 
stance about his life.
In keeping with good clinical practice, I 
contacted relatives, friends, former doctors, and 
obtained collateral stories from these people to provide 
further depth to their stories. 
In these representative three stories, people have 
broken free from the biological psychiatric narrative.   
They spend no money on drugs.  Their daily “meds” 
include yoga, meditation, prayer, all embedded within 
community. They have alternate stories, which would be 
unnoticed by the dominant paradigm. If noticed these 
stories would likely be dismissed as “quacky,” so rare 
that a significant number of people would find them 
unimportant and/or evidence of misdiagnosis (since 
bipolar disorder is, by definition, life-long). 
  Discussion
Rom Harre (personal communication, June 23, 2004) observed that science has two aims: to find a good 
way to classify and pick out phenomena of interest, and 
to find a good way to account for what is going on with 
those phenomena. It is just a disciplined way of looking 
at things. We propose a different way to think about 
extraordinary mental phenomenon.
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When the voices heard by our clients are 
dismissed as meaningless, the construction of meaning 
that can be so healing is derailed.  Creative understanding 
is an unending process whereby dialogue creates that 
which is shared and different about people.  This occurs 
both inside the mind and through meetings with other 
minds.  
These stories represent a repository of 
transformation, and help for the today’s non-responders 
—an alternative that has other solutions in addition to 
medication or besides medication, as the case warrants. 
Each individual has his or her own path to lessen suffering.  
The solution develops from the affected community and 
not the professional expert. 
Within each of our clients, we saw their impulse 
to create shared and multiple understandings even when 
circumstances prohibited that. For these people, their 
dialogue placed them as authors of their own stories, 
narrators of their desires, and contributors to their 
“truth”—while still continuously borrowing from the 
words and discourses available to them to coexist with 
their fellow humans. Our clients were aware that their 
stories lay outside what was considered acceptable in 
most cases.  For them, one size did not fit all.
Bakhtin believed that 
within the arena of...every utterance an intense 
conflict between one’s own and another’s word is 
being fought out....This happens both in the external 
world but also the internal, experiential world of our 
minds, in which some character inevitable disagrees 
with whatever comes forth from our lips. The 
immediate social situation and the broader social 
milieu, both within our minds as maps of the outer 
world complete with bleed throughs from other 
realities and determined by the outer world, wholly 
determine the structure of an utterance.” (Clark & 
Holquist, 1984, p. 220)  
Bakhtin reflected the state of mind within 
so many of our clients’ minds—a state of war among 
conflicting and competing voices.  
Through dialogue that affirmed the lived 
experience of people diagnosed as psychotic, people 
recovered from what was called psychosis. The fact of 
this recovery pushes us toward a social brain hypothesis, 
that human relationships remodel and rewire the brain 
more effectively than pharmacological agents.
Endnotes
1.    These modalities including nutritional strategies, 
micro-nutrient therapies, homeopathy, craniosacral 
therapy, reiki, ritual and ceremony, prayer, traditional 
Chinese medicine with or without acupuncture, 
hypnosis, visualization, yoga, T’ai chi, exercise, chi 
gong, and others.
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